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ABSTRACT
Criminal data comes in a variety of formats, mandated by
state, federal, and international standards. Specifying the
data in a unified fashion is necessary for any system that
intends to integrate with state, federal, and international
law enforcement agencies. However, the contents, format,
and structure of the data is highly inconsistent across ju-
risdictions, and each datum requires different ways of be-
ing printed, transmitted, and displayed. The goal was to
design a system that is unified in its approach to specify
data, and is amenable to future “unknown unknowns”. We
have developed a domain-specific language in Common Lisp
which allows the specification of complex data with evolving
formats and structure, and is inter-operable with the Com-
mon Lisp language. The resultant system has enabled the
easy handling of complex evolving information in the gen-
eral criminal data environment and has made it possible to
manage and extend the system in a high-paced market. The
language has allowed the principal product of Secure Out-
comes Inc. to enjoy success with over 50 users throughout
the United States[4].
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.11 [Software Engineering]: Software Architectures—
Domain-specific architectures; H.2.3 [Database Manage-
ment]: Languages—Data description languages; J.1 [Computer
Applications]: Administrative Data Processing—Govern-
ment
General Terms
Design
Keywords
Common Lisp, databases, domain-specific languages, speci-
fications
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The LS1100
The LS1100 Executive Control System, or simply the LS1100,
is a portable electronic fingerprinting, booking, transmis-
sion, and printing system intended for local, federal, and
international law enforcement agencies, and has been devel-
oped by Secure Outcomes Inc. The LS1100 is fully certified
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and is certified
for digital transmission of fingerprint information to a num-
ber of U.S. states. The control software is written in over
100,000 lines of Common Lisp.
It is important to note that the LS1100 does not deal with
biometrics, but rather the far more technically difficult foren-
sic livescan AFIS (“automatic fingerprint identification sys-
tem”) domain. Biometric fingerprint systems are simpler
commodity items designed to identify persons who want to
be identified (for example, to get physical access through a
door). AFIS systems such as the LS1100, in contrast, are
designed to identify persons who are trying to hide their
identity (for example, a murderer at a crime scene) with
information that will stand up as forensic evidence in the
court of law.
Fingerprint information that feeds the AFIS systems is far
more difficult and complex to collect than data that feeds
biometric systems and is covered by numerous state and
federal standards, certifications, and regulations that con-
stantly evolve. In general, biometric systems do not capture
fingerprint information in a manner that is consistent with
law enforcement fingerprint standards such as ANSI/NIST[3],
FBI EFTS[5], and INTERPOL[1, 6], all of which the LS1100
formally follows.
The user work-flow of the LS1100 is simple. First, a detainee
is brought to an agency’s booking station where the system
resides, and is prepared for fingerprint acquisition. Then the
LS1100 is used according to the following general protocol:
1. Collect forensic quality, fully-rolled digital fingerprints
from the system’s built-in scan device.
2. Collect the detainee’s personal information (e.g., height,
weight, eye color, residence).
3. Print the criminal information on the local jurisdic-
tion’s fingerprint card.
4. Transmit the digital forensic information to the appro-
priate state or federal bureau.
Once this work-flow has been completed, an officer is able
to later query the system for data, edit data, re-print cards,
and re-transmit data.
Despite the relatively simple mode of operation from the
user’s point of view, the control software exhibits signifi-
cant complexity due to the varying and evolving format and
structure of the data. This paper deals with the design and
implementation of the information aspects of the four steps
above.
1.2 System Composition
The LS1100 control software is very complex; it is typically
the only program running on top of the operating system.
It compiles to an 85 megabyte executable and relies on a
500 megabyte collection of runtime files.
The source code is perhaps the most interesting. There
are. . .
• . . . over 105,000 lines of Common Lisp and 2000 lines
of C in over 350 source files.
• . . . over 50 packages.
• . . . over 1300 exported symbols.
• . . . over 2300 defined functions, 130 defined macros,
420 defined parameters, 130 defined variables, and 1000
defined constants.
• . . . approximately 100 general purpose validators (de-
scribed in section 4.4).
• . . . over 500 unique defwidget-io forms (described in
section 4.5).
• . . . over 100 different classes and structures.
• . . . over 60 defined CAPI1 interfaces.
• . . . about 50 third-party software packages.
The system is highly modular. There are approximately 40
discrete subsystems ranging in functionalities. For example,
the system. . .
• . . . contains over five methods of transmission of crimi-
nal data, including FTP, SFTP, Cisco VPN, and SMTP.
• . . . can print on (with quarter-millimeter precision) over
30 types of fingerprint cards, some of which have up
to 6 physical pages.
• . . . contains over 5 context specific touchscreen key-
board types and about a dozen custom GUI widgets
optimized for touchscreens.
1CAPI is LispWorks’ portable GUI toolkit.
• . . . includes a custom high-speed implementation of bi-
nary streams (independent of Lisp streams) with an
implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES).
• . . . includes many administrative tools, such as a database
editor in CLIM, system stress tests, custom profilers,
and performance measurement tools.
2. THE PROBLEM
The principal problem that arises from the four steps in sec-
tion 1.1 is to create a coherent, unified model for the spec-
ification of data to be input (steps 1 and 2), and their au-
tomatic handling in printing and transmission (steps 3 and
4), suitable for a fast paced development environment. This
comes from the fact that every state in the United States ad-
heres to different data acquisition, formatting, printing, and
transmission standards, but are all roughly derived from a
single standard originally developed by the FBI. Moreover,
all states and counties must be able to print on standard
FBI fingerprint cards (the so-called “red” and “blue” cards),
in addition to state- or county-specific fingerprint cards all
of which have different formats.
2.1 Differing Constraints
Different legal jurisdictions impose different requirements on
the data. For example, the state of Wisconsin requires a
subject’s name to comply with the following specification:
• The last name is required, and must consist of between
1 and 30 alphabetic characters.
• The first name is required, and must consist of between
1 and 20 alphabetic characters.
• The middle name is optional, but if present, must con-
sist of between 1 and 20 alphabetic characters.
• The suffix is optional, but if present, must consist of
between 1 and 4 alphabetic characters.
In contrast, the state of Arkansas requires 1–20 characters
for the last name, 1–15 characters for the first name, and
1–3 characters for the suffix. Other data fields, such as hair
color, are completely, incompatibly different.
2.2 Differing Printing/Transmission Formats
Each jurisdiction has its own methodology for printing on
their jurisdiction-specific print media. For example, some
states require a name be printed as Doe, John S while oth-
ers require John, S, Doe — which has a different ordering
of fields with a extra comma.
Transmission is similar, except transmissions are purely dig-
ital. There is a strict form as specified by the FBI in which
data is transmitted, but varies slightly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
3. A UNIFYING DATA MODEL
In general, a piece of data is identified by and operated on
by four pieces of specifying information:
1. The name ν ∈ N : a representation relating a piece of
data to some name. For example, ν might represent
the concept of a subject’s name or gender.
2. The locality ℓ ∈ L: a representation of the jurisdic-
tion that is collecting the data. For example, ℓ might
represent the state of Arkansas.
3. The usage or medium m ∈ M : a representation of
the data’s intent. For example, m might represent
transmission.
4. The index of the data k ∈ N: a natural number in-
dicating which occurrence of the data is needed. For
example, for a detainee with two known name aliases,
the aliases would be identified by k ∈ {1, 2}.
The space of all quadruples (ν, ℓ,m, k) ∈ N × L×M × N is
called the widget space and elements of this space are called
widgets. It only makes sense to talk about data when a wid-
get is specified. It is convenient to think of the widget space
as a space of triples (νk, ℓ,m), where the first component is
actually a vector of name-index pairs in N × N, which we
will denote ~N . We will use the latter convention, and denote
the widget space by W = ~N × L×M .
3.1 Data Acquisition and Storage
The LS1100 system internally attempts to avoid handling of
raw data by any means; almost all data is accessed through
an opaque API which requires a widget. However, the raw
data is required to be stored somehow, independent of the
way the data is used. This suggests that the subspace of
pairs ~N × L define how the data is stored and retrieved.
This is true in the LS1100 system; for each pair (νk, ℓ), a
getter γ and setter σ are defined. For a database D ∈ D
and a datum of type Σ, we have
γ : ~N × L×D → Σ (1)
σ : ~N × L× Σ×D → Σ×D (2)
In other words, the getter γ takes an indexed name and
locale, and queries the database for the datum. The setter
σ takes an indexed name, locale, and a datum, and inserts
it into the database (forming a new database).
3.2 Formatters and Parsers
Each raw piece of data must be formatted, parsed according
to the medium, and checked for errors in a process called
validation. A formatter is a procedure which takes a datum
and a widget w and produces a string of characters repre-
senting that datum. A parser is the inverse; taking a string
of characters and a widget and producing a datum.
The string of characters is always suitable for printing, screen
display, and/or transmission.
3.3 Validation
Before any piece of data is parsed, it is validated by a val-
idator. A validator is a function which takes a widget and
a datum and returns a boolean representing its validity. A
validator v is usually a composition of smaller validators
v1, . . . , vn which are generally composed via conjunction:
v1 ◦ v2 :W × Σ→ {True,False} (3)
: (w, s) 7→ v1(w, s) ∧ v2(w, s).
Other methods of composition, such as disjunction or nega-
tion, are possible and common.
It is important to note that validators are invariant to the
widget’s index.
4. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
All of the theory was realized in ANSI Common Lisp[2] as
a domain-specific language.
4.1 Database Design and Implementation
The database was designed and implemented completely
from scratch to accommodate the tight memory require-
ments of the LS1100, as well as to accommodate the flexibil-
ity required for the fast paced development style employed
at Secure Outcomes Inc.
In the prototype of the LS1100 control software, SQLite was
used together with an ORM between CLOS classes and SQL
entities. After designing a database schema for the first
state, it was quickly discovered that the traditionally static
schema would not suffice because of the rapidly changing
requirements. The database schema had to be redesigned in
order to remove now invalid invariants as well as to encode
new invariants, and the data in the databases had to be
reorganized. Paired with limited versatility of data types2
in SQL, it was considered that another database had to be
created.
The new database design sacrificed the relational database
model for a much more flexible key-value core augmented
with a rich access and retrieval API. The database kernel was
specifically designed to work with any serializable Common
Lisp data type; almost any Common Lisp data type can
be stored as values in the database, including hash tables,
structures, classes, and functions. Name-index pairs, ~N ,
with bounded indexes are implemented as vectors of values.
The core of the database is an on-disk, thread-safe hash ta-
ble mapping Common Lisp keywords to data. Tables may
be augmented with new keys and values at any time. Any
queried key that doesn’t exist will return a unique object
called the uninitialized value. This serves as a type-safe
null value indicating the lack of existence of either a key,
or value associated with a key3. The uninitialized value can
be manipulated and stored as well, and acts as an unboxed
representation of Standard ML’s option type or Haskell’s
Maybe type. Monadic behavior of the uninitialized value is
achieved through a set of Common Lisp macros. See fig. 1
for a type-safe implementation of the uninitialized value.
Database queries are speed-optimized at the expense of mem-
ory; tables are cached in memory and written to disk at ei-
ther a programmer-specified point or when the processor is
2Often, data with no natural data type in SQL were “un-
parsed” to strings.
3It is actually used more generally to denote the lack of
existence of data in other places, such as slots in structures.
available. The benefits far outweigh the costs, for the prin-
cipal SQL table initialized to around 65 megabytes, while
the database described initializes to around 1 kilobyte. A
table filled with criminal data only increases the size by 1–5
kilobytes. (This excludes the forensic-quality fingerprint im-
ages, which are not stored in a table but stored separately
on disk.)
4.2 Data
Common Lisp includes exemplary support for built-in data
types, including flexible strings, a hierarchy of numerical
types, and a selection of linear data structures. As dis-
cussed in section 4.1, almost all data types can be stored
in the database4, including programmer-defined structures
and classes. By allowing a full breadth of types to be stored,
data can typically be stored and retrieved in its most nat-
ural representation, without any need to transform it. The
union of these types forms Σ as described in section 3.
When adding a new data type to the LS1100 software, it typ-
ically suffices to create a structure representing the data, un-
less more control is needed. The new data structures should
typically not place specific constraints on the size or format
of the data, but rather just the types themselves. (Con-
straints are mandated by the validators. See section 4.4.)
A type holding a name conforming to the specification of
section 2.1 follows:
(defstruct name
(last "" :type simple-base-string)
(first "" :type simple-base-string)
(middle "" :type simple-base-string)
(suffix "" :type simple-base-string))
Since each name field is required by almost all state agencies
and a default is provided, it is not necessary to anticipate
an uninitialized value for any of the slot values.
Since Common Lisp provides mechanisms for compiling files
to implementation specific binaries via COMPILE-FILE, and
allows the loading of files via LOAD, it is possible to build a
portable serialization protocol for most values. The initial
version of the LS1100 data serializer was written in less than
25 lines of Common Lisp using the aforementioned standard
functions, and has since been expanded for more intricate
serialization and deserialization protocols.
4.3 Formatters and Parsers
Since data is usually stored in a fashion friendly to pro-
grammers and not users, we have implemented a protocol
for converting between database data, or internal data, and
data that was input or data to be read by a user, or external
data.
Formatters, which map internal data to external data, are
implemented as simple Common Lisp functions mapping
4An exception includes native closures, which rely on run-
time environment information.
data to strings5. For examples of formatters operating on
simple date structures, see fig. 2.
There may be dozens of formatters for common data types,
such as for names, to accommodate the needs of different
agencies.
Parsers are a sort of inverse of formatters, mapping external
data to internal data. Typically, a parser will take a string
and convert it into a data structure suitable for storage. The
string is usually guaranteed to be valid by the time a parser
is called on it, thanks to the validation mechanism described
in the next section. See fig. 3 for an example parser for date
strings.
Since there exist many valid formatters and parsers associ-
ated with a single data type, we use the widget space to
select which gets called for what kind of data. The specifi-
cation of the widget space is described in section 4.5.
4.4 Validators
Validators are defined using a top-level macro DEFVALIDATOR.
DEFVALIDATOR resembles DEFUN in many ways: it takes a
name, argument list, and a body. However, validators aren’t
stored as the name’s SYMBOL-FUNCTION, but rather stored
in the symbol’s property list as a validator. This allows
validators to be stored with equivalent names as standard
Common Lisp functions.
In the body of a validator, the symbol %INPUT is implicitly
bound to the input that will be validated.
In practice, validators don’t return a false value in the case
of failed validation. Instead, a special VALIDATION-ERROR
condition is signaled with information on the nature of the
error, which is shown to the user. For example, consider the
following two validators which check if a string is composed
of numeric characters, and checks the length of a string,
respectively.
(defvalidator numeric ()
(loop
:for c :across %input
:unless (digit-char-p c)
:do (validation-error %input
"The character ’~A’ is not numeric" c)
:finally (return t)))
(defvalidator length (min max)
(let ((len (length %input)))
(cond
((< len min)
(validation-error %input
"Length must be larger than ~D" min))
((> len max)
(validation-error %input
"Length must be smaller than ~D" max))
(t t))))
5Though not necessarily. For fingerprint images, finger-
prints are stored as compressed bitmaps and are converted
to the binaries compressed with the wavelet scalar quanti-
zation algorithm, as mandated by the FBI.
Figure 1: Simple implementation of the uninitialized value.
(defun print-uninitialized (object stream depth)
(declare (ignore depth))
(print-unreadable-object (object stream)
(princ "UNINITIALIZED")))
(defstruct (uninitialized (:print-function print-uninitialized))
;; no slots
)
;;; DEFCONSTANT cannot be used because MAKE-UNINITIALIZED will not produce
;;; values that are EQL.
(defvar +uninitialized-value+ (make-uninitialized))
(defun uninitialized ()
+uninitialized-value+)
(deftype maybe (&rest types)
"A type representing a possibly empty value."
‘(or uninitialized ,@types))
Figure 2: Sample formatters for date structures.
(defun format-simple-date-short (date)
"Format a date DATE in the American short way.
EXAMPLE: 7/4/2010"
(format nil "~A/~A/~A"
(simple-date.month date)
(simple-date.day date)
(simple-date.year date)))
(defun format-simple-date-long (date)
"Format a date DATE in the American long way.
EXAMPLE: the fourth of July, 2010"
(format nil "the ~:R of ~A, ~A"
(simple-date.day date)
(nth (1- (simple-date.month date))
(list "January" "February" "March" "April"
"May" "June" "July" "August"
"September" "October" "November" "December"))
(simple-date.year date)))
Figure 3: Sample parser for dates.
(defun parse-simple-date-fbi (str)
"Parse the FBI-style date which may include optional slashes."
(make-simple-date :year (parse-integer (remove #\/ str) :start 0 :end 4)
:month (parse-integer (remove #\/ str) :start 4 :end 6)
:day (parse-integer (remove #\/ str) :start 6 :end 8)))
Each of these signals an error condition to the user, specify-
ing either which characters are the offending input, or what
is wrong with the input in general. This is also why the
NUMERIC validator does not use EVERY — we wish to know
which character is invalid as well for a more constructive
error message.
Several validators can be composed using a domain-specific
language analogous to Boolean algebra. Logical conjunction
of several validators is specified by the VALIDATORS form
which coincides with (3). For most cases, conjunction is
sufficient, since most validators are small and have a very
simple semantic meaning.
In some cases, logical disjunction is useful for more compli-
cated validations. As such, OR is defined inside of validator
forms. For example, to create a validator which checks that
the input must be between 3 and 7 characters, and must be
either entirely alphabetic or entirely numeric, one constructs
the following:
(validators
(length 3 7)
(or alphabetic
numeric
"Input must be alphabetic or numeric."))
The complete macro expansion of this can be found in fig. 4.
4.5 A Language for Widgets
A domain-specific language was developed in order to sim-
plify the definition of objects in the widget space, and asso-
ciating them with setters, getters, formatters, and parsers.
The core of the language is based around a macro DEFWIDGET,
which takes the (ν, ℓ) pair and a set of keys defining how a
datum a widget refers to is handled.
The basic syntax follows:
WIDGET ::=
(defwidget <WIDGET NAME> <LOCALE NAME>
:index <INTEGER> ; maximum index
:getter <FUNCTION>
:setter <FUNCTION>
:input (<PARSER>*)
:output (<FORMATTER>*)
FORMATTER ::=
(<MEDIUM> <FUNCTION>)
| (:default <FUNCTION>)
PARSER ::=
(<MEDIUM> <FUNCTION> <VALIDATOR>)
The execution of this form will register the widget and the
associated properties into the system.
4.6 Defaults
In practice, a lot of data properties are shared. For example,
much of the criminal text data is stored as strings which can
be displayed without modification. As such, the formatter
is IDENTITY for all media of that widget. A particular piece
of data called the ”state ID number” follows this pattern.
(defwidget sid arkansas
<...>
:input ((:ls1100-entry ’identity
(validators alphanumeric
(length 6 12))))
:output ((:ls1100-entry ’string-upcase)
(:lookup ’identity)
(:fbi-criminal-249 ’identity)
(:fbi-applicant-258 ’identity)
(:transmission ’identity)))
We have found that it is more productive to simply provide
a default, which is denoted by :DEFAULT.
(defwidget-io sid arkansas
<...>
:input ((:ls1100-entry ’identity
(validators alphanumeric
(length 6 12))))
:output ((:ls1100-entry ’string-upcase)
(:default ’identity)))
Notice that the default can be overridden.
4.7 Inheritance
There is a lot of behavior sharing between (in the case of
the United States) the FBI specifications, state specifica-
tions, and county specifications. This suggests a hierarchical
notion of locales.
In almost all jurisdictions, the way a subject’s date of birth is
specified is the same. As such, we define a “common locale”,
symbolized by COMMON, which is the top of the locale tree.
(defwidget dob common
<...>
:input ((:ls1100-entry ’parse-date-fbi
(validators required
date)))
:output ((:ls1100-entry ’format-date-fbi)
(:fbi-criminal-249 ’format-date-card)
(:fbi-applicant-258 ’format-date-short)
(:transmission ’format-date-fbi)
(:DEFAULT ’format-date-card)))
In almost all jurisdictions, a date of birth will be formatted
and parsed as specified. However, many states and local
jurisdictions have specific unique fingerprint cards requiring
certain kinds of formatting. So, for example, we define a
widget for Arkansas-specific formatting.
(defwidget dob arkansas
<...>
:output ((:ar-arrest ’format-date-short)
(:ar-supplemental ’format-date-short)))
Figure 4: Macro expansion of a validator clause.
(LAMBDA (#:TEXT-789583)
(FUNCALL (VALIDATING-FUNCTION ’LENGTH 3 7) #:TEXT-789583)
(FUNCALL (LAMBDA (#:INPUT-789600)
(IF (EVERY #’NULL
(LIST (CATCH (LET ((#:OR-SUBFORM-RESULT789617
CONDITIONS::*HANDLER-CLUSTERS*))
(IF #:OR-SUBFORM-RESULT789617
#:OR-SUBFORM-RESULT789617
’CONDITIONS::NEW-IGNORE-ERRORS-HANDLER))
(LET ((#:G789645
’CONDITIONS::NEW-IGNORE-ERRORS-HANDLER))
(DECLARE (DYNAMIC-EXTENT #:G789645))
(LET ((CONDITIONS::*HANDLER-CLUSTERS*
(CONS (LIST (CONS ’ERROR #:G789645))
CONDITIONS::*HANDLER-CLUSTERS*)))
(FUNCALL (FUNCALL (SYMBOL-VALIDATOR ’ALPHABETIC))
#:INPUT-789600))))
(CATCH (LET ((#:OR-SUBFORM-RESULT789672
CONDITIONS::*HANDLER-CLUSTERS*))
(IF #:OR-SUBFORM-RESULT789672
#:OR-SUBFORM-RESULT789672
’CONDITIONS::NEW-IGNORE-ERRORS-HANDLER))
(LET ((#:G789700
’CONDITIONS::NEW-IGNORE-ERRORS-HANDLER))
(DECLARE (DYNAMIC-EXTENT #:G789700))
(LET ((CONDITIONS::*HANDLER-CLUSTERS*
(CONS (LIST (CONS ’ERROR #:G789700))
CONDITIONS::*HANDLER-CLUSTERS*)))
(FUNCALL (FUNCALL (SYMBOL-VALIDATOR ’NUMERIC))
#:INPUT-789600))))))
(ERROR ’VALIDATION-ERROR
:VALUE #:INPUT-789600
:MESSAGE "Input must be alphabetic or numeric.")
T)))
#:TEXT-789583)
T)
This Arkansas-specific definition inherits everything from
the COMMON locale, and avoids duplicating the need to re-
define higher jurisdiction cards (e.g., federal).
The defwidget macro does not actually specify inheritance
since many defwidget forms refer to the same locale. Instead,
a locale inheritance tree is defined via the
(add-locale! child parent)
form, which constructs the inheritance tree by specifying a
directed edge from child to parent.
Initialization of the locale inheritance tree starts by defining
the root node COMMON which is the top of the lattice, and
proceeds in a depth-first fashion:
;;; Root of locale tree
(add-locale! :common nil)
;;; United States
(add-locale! :united-states :common)
(add-locale! :colorado :united-states)
(add-locale! :park-county-co :colorado)
<...>
(add-locale! :minnesota :united-states)
(add-locale! :ramsey-county-mn :minnesota)
<...>
;;; Canada
(add-locale! :canada :common)
(add-locale! :nova-scotia :canada)
<...>
The locale inheritance tree is defined at runtime to allow
hot-loading locale-specific patches and updates to the wid-
get system (e.g., if a county requests a particular way of
formatting a datum on their cards).
4.8 Application Programmer Interface
The principal API consists of two fusions of four functions:
γ fused with formatter = GET-AND-FORMAT-DATA
and
parser fused with σ = PARSE-AND-SET-DATA
This fusion eliminates the need to explicitly retrieve data
and consequently format it for a particular application, and
removes the need to manually call a widget’s validator, pars-
ing function, and setter.
These functions are actually more than just a fusion of the
getters and formatters (or parsers and setters); they do the
extra work of actually finding and resolving the formatters
and parsers. The resolution algorithm is as follows:
1. Check if the formatter/parser is defined at the current
locale. If it is, then return it.
2. Check if a default formatter/parser is defined at the
current locale. If it is, then return it.
3. Move to the current locale’s parent.
(a) If no parent exists, fail with“No formatter/parser
specified.”
(b) Otherwise, go to step 1.
4.9 Extensions In Production
The actual production code contains many extensions to the
DEFWIDGET form.
Perhaps most importantly, it allows one to easily specify
certain database tables in which the data is stored which has
the benefit of automatically generating getters and setters
for the programmer. These can always be overridden by
specifying a getter and/or setter explicitly and also allows
the widget system to be used for broader things, such as
storing system settings.
Other extensions include the possibility to specify context-
dependent headings for the data in the case the data should
be presented to the user (e.g., for user queries or data sum-
maries). It is also possible to specify on-line documentation,
stored data type, and random data generators (useful for
unit testing and generating random but valid test data).
5. ADVANTAGES AND ISSUES
The use of Common Lisp has allowed for the simple cre-
ation of a domain-specific language for specifying and vali-
dating data. Comparatively, in another language such as C,
a special parser would be needed for the creation of a small
language and extending the language would be difficult.
5.1 Common Lisp
The benefits of using Common Lisp extend beyond its ex-
emplary metaprogramming facilities. Garbage collection —
pioneered by Lisp systems but now common in many lan-
guages —makes managing resources convenient and suitable
for long-running programs (the LS1100 is usually running for
months at a time without restarting). Additional runtime
stability comes from the fact that Lisp has been standard-
ized since 1994 — and implementations have existed prior —
allowing for implementations to mature and stabilize. Most
behavior of the language is formally specified, and those ar-
eas of the language where behavior is ambiguous have been
identified and informally resolved. Along with stable imple-
mentations come high-performance compilers. Since a large
part of the LS1100 control software is dedicated to acquisi-
tion and analysis of high-resolution images, and since images
are captured and displayed in real time on embedded hard-
ware, it is necessary to have fast native code.
In general, the benefits of using Common Lisp for applica-
tion development are well known. However, Secure Out-
comes developers have also identified places where Common
Lisp has fallen short, most importantly the lack of static
types.
A static type system is one where the type of every variable
and value is known at compile time, and the types of ev-
ery interaction between variables and values are verified at
compile time. In large applications such as ours, ensuring
type correctness is almost an impossible task. The best that
can be done is ensure runtime type checking is done. The
problem with runtime type checking is that type errors are
only found during the course of execution of the program,
which can happen weeks or months later. When a type er-
ror is signaled, there’s little chance of recourse when it is
unanticipated and the user must restart the system entirely,
which is often unacceptable when a detainee is required to
be booked.
5.2 Custom Database
The advantages of using a custom database designed from
the ground up for the application have largely been outlined
previously. However, there are a few disadvantages.
One of the largest disadvantages is lack of maturity. Since
the system is built from scratch, ensuring data integrity is a
concern. In a law enforcement environment, loss of data can
also be a loss of criminal evidence and records, and as such
is completely unacceptable. Costly database backups must
be made regularly in the event of a catastrophic database
failure.
Another disadvantage caused by the flexibility of the possi-
ble data types stored is the difficulty in searching the data
efficiently and the lack of query optimization — two prob-
lems largely solved in database research and implementa-
tions. Presently, the entire database must be walked for a
general search. This problem is somewhat alleviated by pro-
viding specialized searches, such as name and alias searches,
which use specially constructed indexes of the database.
6. CONCLUSION
Devising a domain-specific language in Common Lisp has
been essential to the growth, rapid development, and deliv-
ery to the market of database interaction mechanisms for the
LS1100 system. By modeling the data domain and how it
is statically parameterized, and by developing simple meth-
ods for interacting with a database in this model, we were
able to develop a flexible language that solves the problem
of inconsistent and constantly changing specifications. The
language takes advantage of natural inheritance and dupli-
cation in specifications, and was the catalyst for the ongoing
success of the LS1100 livescan fingerprinting system.
Using Common Lisp to implement the LS1100 Executive
Control System was a significant design decision. The deci-
sion proved to be correct — I believe that to implement the
system in another language would have grossly extended the
design, coding, and testing time required. In particular, the
meta-programming capabilities uniquely provided by Com-
mon Lisp enabled the fast development of this complex com-
mercial product that operates in its highly regulated envi-
ronment.
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